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NON-STATUTORY C ANGES DURING THE DEPRESSION

opposition to the consent receivership, apparent in 1928,
increased. In 1932, in Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co.,2' 3 the question before the Supreme Court was whether state taxes should have
priority over claims of creditors to the proceeds of an equity receivership
sale. The court held the taxes were payable before creditors' claims, and in
an opinion written by Justice Cardozo took occasion to refer again to the
abuses of the consent receivership. He stated that the court has "had occasion to point out the abuses that can arise from friendly receiverships
forestalling the normal processes of administration in bankruptcy and
enabling a tottering business to continue while creditors are held at bay."
In Shapiro v. Wilgus,25 4 an individual debtor incorporated in order to
avoid the rule that an individual debtor could not consent to a receivership, and then three days later went into a consent receivership as a
corporation. The Supreme Court allowed a judgment creditor to levy
execution on property in the hands of the federal receiver, stating: "True
indeed it is that receivers have at times been appointed even by the
federal courts at the suit of simple contract creditors if the defendant
was willing to waive the irregularity and to consent to the decree.... We
have given warning more than once, however, that the remedy in such
circumstances is not to be granted loosely, but is to be watched with
jealous eyes. '' 2SS The attitude of the Supreme Court in this case is to be
compared with the holding of a federal district court that a debtor may
incorporate itself and proceed in good faith under section 77B.216
Judicial distemper against the consent receivership reached its height
* Prepared, together with articles published in the December and February issues of this
Review, by the authors for the International Academy of Comparative Law, The Hague, as
reporters on the liquidation and reorganization legislation of England, Canada, and the United
States. The previous articles dealt with the English and Canadian history and experience in
this field, the early American bankruptcy legislation, and statutory changes during the de-

pression.
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in the May Hosiery Mills case.27 The F. &. W. Grand 5-10-25 cent stores
was in consent receivership in the Southern District of New York. There
were twenty-eight ancillary receiverships throughout the country. The
reorganizers hit a snag in the district court of Montana. The court not
only refused to appoint a consent receiver but held the attorneys in contempt for applying for a receiver. The language of the court was not
temperate. Among a great many other things it said:
"That New York counsel are leaders and of Who's Who is of course.
The experience, skill, finesse, effrontery, prestige, and impressive personality of counsel of that rank were necessary to devise the plan and program and to impose it upon courts. Unethical practice is by no means
limited to the lesser of the bar. It is ventured that the most subtle and
effective ambulance chasers operate on golf links, in the club, at the
poker table, behind a smoke screen of claim agents, and in collusion with
banks and trust companies who are the ostensible advertisers for business
the profit of which is divided. Moreover, like Western Chinamen, all
counsel should look alike, in court at least. ' '211 On appeal the contempt
holdings were reversed.28 9 The dismissal of the creditor's bill was by that
time moot since the debtor was in bankruptcy. But the air was not particularly dear.
Finally in First National Bank v. Flerskem,290 the Supreme Court
tackled the problem of whether an equity receivership could be resorted
to as a means of reorganizing solvent corporations. The National Radiator Corporation which had been losing money, but whose ratio of current
assets to current liabilities was more than ten to one, and whose ratio
of cash on hand to all current liabilities was three and one half to one,
felt that it would be economically wise to reduce its liability on debentures. Accordingly a plan was prepared which involved the creation of a
new corporation and the substitution of income debentures and stock for
the present debentures, which had a sinking fund requirement. In order
to prevent action by dissenting debenture holders, the old corporation
went into receivership on a petition by the co-operating debenture holders' committee. The trustee for the debenture holders intervened and
proceeded as the plaintiff in the receivership proceedings. A judicial sale
to the new corporation at a low upset price was then confirmed. On
287May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. F. W. Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores, Inc., 59 F. (2d) 218
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Justice Brandeis held that the dissenting debenture holders were
entitled to be paid in full, and that the receivership was improper. Although he pointed out not only the lack of insolvency in either the bankruptcy or equity sense and the presence of sufficient cash for current
operations, in a footnote to the case he sought to limit the use of the
receivership as a reorganization device to railroads and other public utilities.9 Thus the case, though distinguishable on its facts, cast serious
doubt not only on the propriety of receiverships for solvent corporations
with inadequate funds, but on the use of receiverships for the reorganization of all industrials.
Meanwhile some of the lower federal courts had perfected a rationale
for the consent receivership itself which apparently has survived the depression as a rule of thumb. Judge Augustus Hand in Kingsport Press
v. Brief English Systems 2 92 laid down two elements which would be important in determining the propriety of the receivership: (i) Did creditors
need the receivership so that they would get paid and avoid preferences;
(2) Is the objection to the receivership made seasonably. A third possible
element was: Is bankruptcy available. Judge Learned Hand made a similar statement in Ex parte Relmar Holding Co.293 Judge Evans added the
requirement that there must be full disclosure to the court of the relationship between the debtor and creditors and the recommended receiver.
He pointed out that the difficulty was not with the "consent receivership"

-appeal,

but with a "friendly receiver. ' '294 And to calm the fears of reorganizers

who were still involved in equity receiverships, Judge Woolsey in In re
ParamountPublix Corp.29s stated "The familiar cry of collusion in a consent receivership is advanced here, but, as usual, it had not any merit.';

96

The federal courts had developed the devices of a hearing on the foreclosure decree, an upset price, hearing on the date for a sale, and on the
confirmation of the sale, as a means of coIitrolling, to some extent, reorganizations before them. The state courts had been more reluctant to develop their equity jurisprudence. The passage of federal reorganization
laws threatened to put all reorganizations of any importance into federal
courts. The federal courts commented on the defects in the state court's
procedure. One federal court spoke of "The state courts being somewhat
restricted in making effective proposed reorganization when confronted
291Id. at 515, note 7.
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by minority opposition. ' ' 297 This declaration brought the response from
the state court that "equity powers of State courts are no more limited
than those of Federal courts.298 Jealousy made for progress.
Indeed the early emergency days of the depression saw some of the
state courts going farther than the federal courts ever had gone, and taking a position from which the state courts themselves have since receded.
In Suring v. Giese,299 the Wisconsin court affirmed a decree which confirmed a sale on condition that the plaintiff be denied a deficiency judgment. The court spoke approvingly of the power to refuse to confirm a
sale altogether, when inadequacy of the price is coupled with an emergency,
such as the economic crisis, which prevents competitive bidding. It also
spoke approvingly of the power to set an upset price and elsewhere in
the opinion stated that "future or potential value ... may legitimately
be taken into account." The Circuit Court of Cook County went even
further and expressly forbade the mortgagee from foreclosing until economic conditions changed.300 In a somewhat less radical case, the New
York Supreme Court of Chautauqua County set an upset price for the
protection of guarantors; it stressed abnormal conditions as the justification for the exercise of the power. 30 ' The New Jersey courts in the early
days of the depression went far towards withholding confirmation until
the fair value was credited on the decree, remarking that "such a sale is
no longer of any protection to the mortgagor. His shield has been converted into a sword to be used against hin."3o2
These were innovating cases for the state courts in that they recognized
that the devices of refusal to confirm and the upset price might be used
by them. But they were more radical in their use of the economic crisis
as the reason for refusal to confirm or for setting an upset price. And the
implication of the Giese case was that the fair value which would be required was not the fair value during depression times, but under normal
conditions. Such a doctrine was clearly only an emergency doctrine.
These courts soon receded to the position that if the bid were fair under
the state of the market at the time the bid was made then the sale would
197 In re Knickerbocker Hotel Co., 8i F. (2d) 98r (C.C.A. 7th 1936).
29SLevy v. Broadway-Carmen Bldg. Corp., 366 Il. 279 (1937).
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0
have to be confirmed. The Wisconsin court receded in Kremer v. Rule '
and Weiner v. Uthus.30 4 In the first case it refused to consider the market

value of the premises at some remote time in the past, and said that it
was looking for real value at the time of the sale. In the latter case the
court remarked that "an emergency is not a fairly permanent condition
of affairs", and held that a bid should be confirmed when it is not so low
as to shock the conscience of the chancellor, and "only represents a diss reversed
agreement as to present value." The Illinois Appellate Court ""
the extremely radical decision of the Cook County chancellor to forbid
foreclosure until economic conditions changed. The New York courts,
after establishing their inherent right to refuse confirmation, stated that
all that was desired was a normal bid under the conditions then prevailing.SO6 The idea of a general court-imposed moratorium was disavowed;

"to this court the sleeping of causes is as unthinkable as the sleeping of
judges."' s° The New Jersey court denied that the depression was any
defense to stay a foreclosure action30s
But the importance of these early decisions should not be denied. At
the beginning of the depression the Illinois Supreme Court had said that
the chancellor had no power to fix an upset price. s09 At the end of the
depression the same court announced with considerable eloquence that
the inherent power of the court of equity was such that the chancellor in
the proper exercise of his discretion could set an upset price.31 ° The prac-

tice of the state courts in debtor relief cases had its effect on the creditor
relief situation. The example of federal legislation and the jealousy of
the state courts towards the federal courts were contributing factors. Thus
the Illinois court in 1936 for the first time recognized that it had jurisdiction over the plan of reorganization."'1 It recognized that it was impossible to determine whether the bid of the majority committee was fair
without first determining whether the plan offered to security holders by
the committee was fair.
The court's jurisdiction over the plan thus came to be recognized in
303
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the state courts. While the more standard practice was for a majority
or minority committee to intervene in the receivership and ask the court
to pass on the plan, collateral attack was also allowed through an application in an independent proceeding for a restraining order to prevent the
majority committee from consummating an allegedly unfair plan.3- One
New York decision, later reversed, went to the extent of removing the
members of a bondholders' committee. 3 3 An aid to the court's jurisdiction was the desire of reorganizers to gain preliminary approval of the
terms upon which certificates of deposit were to be issued, in order to
gain exemption from registration of the certificates under the Securities
Act. 3 4 Another factor was that when a house of issue was in receivership
the court gained control over the lists of security holders which the house
had. When these lists were of security holders of other debtors in reorganization, the court could deny or grant access to these lists as a
means of preferring or discouraging plans of reorganization of the other
debtors, and thus exercise indirect control over them.35 Judge Mack similarly used his position to gain the organization of bondholders' committees,
which would be willing to submit disputes to impartial arbiters, the consent of the arbiter to be required before any action possibly detrimental
3 6
to security holders could be taken. ,
A depression phenomenon was the renewed interest in trustee purchase.
Many trust indentures give the trustee under the indenture power to
purchase at the foreclosure sale for the benefit of all bondholders. Under
these circumstances the trustee will not be required to pay cash save for
the expenses of the sale, and any claims prior to those of the bondholders.
There can be no dissenters. Trustee purchase, when allowed, was one way
through which the court could gain jurisdiction of the plan. The trustee
holding the property for all the bondholders would be under the power
of the court. The property could be operated during this period by the
trustee, and a plan of reorganization could be worked out under the
supervision of the court. It was extremely questionable whether a trustee
might purchase, however, ff there were no express provision in the inden312Bergelt v. Roberts, 258 N.Y.S. 905, 258 N.Y.S. xo86 (1932); see also Rice v. Pounds,
274 N.Y.S. 637 (1934)313Harrigan v. Pounds, 147 Misc. 666, reversed in 265 N.Y.S. 676 (I933).
314 See Fortas, The Securities Act and Corporate Reorganization, 4 Law and Contemporary

Problems 218 (1937).
3s1See Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-I44 Joralemon St. Corp., 269 N.Y.S. 437 (1934).
3z6See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Part MI, Committees for the
Holders of Real Estate Bonds, appendix B (1936).
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ture giving him the power to do so. The Pennsylvania court in the classic
case of Nay Aug Lumber Co. v. Scranton Trust Company, held that the
power to purchase might be implied; 3' 7 but the case was not followed in
most jurisdictions.35 And no court had ever held that the trustee, in
the absence of a direction from the court, would be under a duty to purchase. But the Illinois Appellate Court in Straus v. Chicago Title and
Trust Company not only held that the trustee might be ordered to purchase, but said that he had an implied duty to do so. 3 9 If the Straus case
had remained as the law of the state, it would have upset reorganization
practice completely, since committees, which had worked out plans of
reorganization, would have no assurance that the trustee and the court
would use that plan; nor would it be clear that committees under such
circumstances would receive fees or expenses for the work they had done.
In effecf the Straus case was later overruled, although the court attempted
to distinguish it on the basis that in the Straus case the indenture specifically gave the trustee the power to purchase.3"° The development of the
court's jurisdiction over the plan made trustee-purchase less important,
and it was not a vital issue during the last stages of the depression.
The last days of the depression indicated that trustees under indentures
and committee members might be held to greater liability than they had
been in the past. 32 ' Both trustees and committee members have insulated
themselves in the past by broad exculpatory provisions. These provisions
were usually effective. 3 - But the impact of legislation and the general
reform movement is such that trustees who authorize the substitution of
worthless securities,33 or who collect their own debts ahead of the debts
of the security holders24 may well be held liable in the future. The indication is clear, also, that committee members who buy securities from bondholders on the basis of special undisclosed knowledge may be held liable n' 5
317 240 Pa. 500, 87 AtI. 843 (X913).
318See Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 85 F. (2d) 513 (C.C.A. ioth 1929).
319273 Ill. App. 63 (1933).
320Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Robin, 361 Il. 261 (1935); Chicago Title and Trust Co.
v. Bamburg, 361 Ill. 291 (1935).
3- Hazzard v. Chas6 National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y.S. 541 (1936); Starr v. Chase
National Bank, N.Y. L. J. Sept. 21, 1936, p. 771, col. 6; First Trust Co. of Lincoln, Neb.
v. Ricketts, 75 F. (2d) 309 (C.C.A. 8th 1934).
- See Posner, Liability of the Trustee under the Trust Indenture, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 198
(1928).
323The Hazzard case, note 321 supra.
34 The Starr case, note 321 supra.
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THE EVILS OF REORGANIZATION; PROPOSED
FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The problem of reorganization is primarily a problem of how a failing
debtor may be made economically sound and at the same time the rights,
insofar as they exist, of the creditors and stockholders be preserved under
a fair arrangement. The result of a reorganization then should be a plan
which is both fair and economically sound. If the final plan is not fair,
there is less justification for preventing individual creditors from gaining
preferences for themselves by their separate attacks upon the property.
If the plan is not economically sound, the plan will be short lived; the
evils which were at work to cause the old failure continue at work to
cause a recurrence. In the United States, the problem of reorganization
was not always recognized in the terms we have just stated. The history
of the equity receivership as applied to reorganization was, for much of
the time, the history of receiverships and foreclosures leading to supposedly fair judicial sales. But the symbols finally molded themselves, so that
whatever usefulness they had lay in their flexibility as devices in the hands
of a court, which wished to guide the reorganization into a fair and economically sound plan.
The problem of course has many aspects. At the outset reorganizers
were faced with the difficulty of gaining a single forum in which the reorganization might be carried out. Equity receiverships required ancillary receiverships in every jurisdiction where the debtor had property.
In bankruptcy proceedings, the separate ancillary proceedings followed
as of course,326 but were nevertheless necessary, and the court had summary jurisdiction only over property of the debtor which was in the debtor's possession. The federal reorganization statutes have supplied the
remedy. Indeed, they may have gone too far, because the control of the
reorganization court today is so great that there may be statutory power
which would authorize the trial of in personam actions in the reorganization
court at great expense and inconvenience to third persons. 7 Reorganizers
were also confronted with the problem of gaining a binding adjudication
as to the reorganization which they had perfected. This difficulty had
never been completely vanquished. The reorganization statutes, however, give the court the jurisdiction to effect a binding decree on the accepted plan. Thus the reorganizers' problem as to a forum in which re3

§ 2 (20) of Bankr. Act.
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organization may be completed finally and in one proceeding has been
solved.
Probably the most pressing problem which confronted reorganizers was
the necessity under the reorganization law in the United States to pay
cash to the dissenters. This leads to several difficulties. In the first place
there was the theoretical difficulty of determining how much a dissenter
should get before the sale would be fair. In the second place there was
the practical difficulty that if the dissenter were to get too much, the
reorganization might be impossible, and the position of the dissenters
in reorganizations generally would become so attractive that future
reorganizations be blocked. And in the third place this increased the
necessity to raise cash, which in turn made the position of the stockholder
who was willing to contribute cash much more important. The federal
reorganization statutes have removed the necessity to pay cash to dissenters. If the dissenters represent more than one-third of a class, it may
be necessary under the federal acts to pay them the value of their claims
in cash, but if two-thirds of any class have agreed to the plan of reorganization, dissenters will be bound.
The other problems of reorganization growing out of the central problem of an economically sound and fair plan have not been solved by the
developments in reorganization practice during the depression in the
United States. Some steps have been taken towards their solution, however, and proposed legislation now before Congress may do much to solve
some of the difficulties.
One problem which remains unsolved is the relative position which
security holders should occupy after the reorganization has been effected.
On one theory secured creditors are entitled to absolute payment before
unsecured creditors are admitted.328 A somewhat opposite theory holds
that all creditors are entitled to a maintenance of their relative positions; 329 so that all creditors will be entitled to representation in the reorganized company, with the prior creditors having the prior right to
income. In practice neither theory has been completely adopted. The
situation has been complicated by the theory that stockholders are in a
sense the debtor, and that to allow stockholders to participate before
creditors are paid in full smacks of a fraudulent conveyance. 330 On the
38 Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization ig
Va. L. Rev. 698 (1933).
329 Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade,
27

Col. L. Rev. 9ox
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See Frank's "Farmer Smooth" illustration in 19 Va. L. Rev. 541 (1933).
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other hand, it is well known that under modem business conditions, stockholders are investors just as bondholders are, and that a division which
places stockholders into the class of owners as opposed to creditors is
slightly unrealistic. 33 Further, as the reorganization process has grown
up stockholders are likely to have great control over the proceedings. In
depression times there was sympathy for stockholders, equally if not more
than for bondholders; and the theory that stockholders, more than any
other class, would be willing to give new money as the price of their participation also increased the stockholders' power over the plan of reorganization.
The problem of the relative position which security holders should
occupy has never been squarely faced. Probably the theory that secured
claims must be first paid off in full is the dominant notion, modified, it
is said, by practical conditions.332 Practical conditions required the introduction of stockholders, and the Boyd case required that intermediate
classes be allowed to participate. The result then began to support a
relative priority theory, but the amount of priority, which in dollars and
cents was the important question, was never decided. During the depression, however, stockholders did not contribute cash assessments. Save
for their nuisance value, stockholders would have no right to participate
in the reorganization of an insolvent corporation (insolvent in the bankruptcy sense), if the theory of absolute payment to secured claimants
were accepted. Nevertheless the reorganization acts are drawn so that
while it is possible to omit stockholders entirely if the debtor is insolvent, 333 nevertheless there is no requirement that this be done; indeed,
under the reorganization acts it was first argued that in no case might
3 4
stockholders be entirely eliminated. 1

The sacrosanct position which secured creditors occupy is due to the
remedy of which they are supposedly deprived. If secured creditors have
a right to have their security sold to pay their claims, then obviously
creditors with secured claims should be able to insist that no one else
participate in the security until the secured creditors are paid.335 It was
this idea which found expression in the composition section of the bank33'Isaacs, Business Security and Legal Security, 37 Harv. L. Rev.

201 (1923).

332Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders on
Reorganization, 28 Col. L. Rev. 127 (1928).
333 In re 620 Church Street Building Corporation, 57 S. Ct. 88 (1936) (insolvent in the
bankruptcy sense).
334 See In re Reading Hotel Corporation, io F. Supp. 470 (Pa. 1935).
33SSee Tennessee Publishing Co. v. American Nat. Bank, 57 S. Ct. 85 (1936).
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ruptcy act prior to the depression. That section did not affect secured
claims at all. And it is the same notion which says that if there is a judicial
sale of the security free and clear of the lien of the creditor, then the lien
should attach to the proceeds. The absolute theory of priority is the inevitable result. The theory, however, is entirely unrealistic in the reorganization of a large company. Here the secured creditor only formally
forecloses. Once it is admitted that the proceeding is primarily a reorganization proceeding, and that it is always that, it becomes strange to talk
of depriving a secured creditor of a right which he never exercises. The
only right the secured creditor has is the right to participate in the plan
of reorganization. The participation that the secured creditor should have
cannot be determined by the right that he would have if there were no
reorganization. Such a procedure is a reference to a nonexistent right,
since there is always a reorganization.
The confusion over the position the secured creditor should occupy is
great. Section 74, the first depression arrangement statute, allowed secured claims to be extended but not reduced. In practical effect, an extension is a reduction, and it is difficult to find a theoretical justification
for one and not the other. The inability to reduce secured claims by anything other than an extension seriously impaired the usefulness of section
74. It is therefore somewhat strange to find that in the proposed revision
of the bankruptcy act now before congress, Chapter XI, which is in lieu
of sections 12 and 74, appears without any provisioii for either the reduction or extension of secured claims.-3 6 The revision now proposed, therefore, so far as section 74 is concerned, has adopted the theory that secured
claims are sacrosanct and entitled to be paid off completely before other
claims may be paid. On the other hand, the proposed revision has a
special chapter dealing with real estate mortgages, 337 and that chapter,
which is applicable only to unincorporated debtors, allows secured claims
to be reduced, and apparently makes only incidental provision for unsecured claims which, however, may also be reduced if two-thirds of
the class accept. It is extremely difficult to find any justification for the
position that secured claims may be reduced under the new Chapter XII,
but that they may not be reduced under Chapter XI. And if the justification is that Chapter XI is intended for only mildly afflicted debtors, and
336Chapter XI of H.R. 8046, the proposed revision of the Bankruptcy Act, commonly
known as the Cjaandler Bill. Chapter XI is of more importance than section 74 is, because
under proposed Chapter X, which takes the place of 77B, a petition must state "the specific
why adequate relief cannot be obtained under Chapter XI of this Act."
facts showing ....
(Sec. 130).
337 Chapter XII.
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hence secured claims be not reduced, it is yet difficult to know why the
rights of stockholders may not be changed under that chapter.
Sections 77 and 77B of the bankruptcy act passed during the depression
allowed the reduction of secured claims. But the position which claimants
were to occupy in the proposed plan of reorganization was not made
clear in the statute. It is probable that any plan which preserved the
relative position of the classes and has won the two-thirds approval of the
secured class, no unusual factors being present, would be considered a
fair plan. But where the plan has not won the two-thirds approval of
the secured class, it has been suggested that the plan which does not pay
off secured claimants in full will either be an unfair plan, or, if fair under
the act, that the act is unconstitutional since it takes away the security
of the secured creditors without due process of law.-3' Such a view is
tenable, however, only on two grounds. The first ground would be that
secured creditors are entitled to payment in full before anyone else is
paid. But the acceptance of that ground would mean that even if twothirds of the secured creditors approved the plan, the plan would be unfair
or unconstitutional as to the remaining one-third. The second ground
would have to hold that secured claims may be reduced only if two-thirds
of the holders agree to the reduction. But it is difficult to see what magic
lies in the two-thirds number. Indeed, section 74 allowed an extension
of secured claims when there was only a bare majority in number and
amount of all claimants, which might mean less than a majority of secured
claimants. But, of course, in this respect section 74 might be unconstitutional. Nevertheless the question remains. Suppose a majority of secured
creditors do approve, but forty per cent of the secured creditors are
opposed. Upon what basis can it be said that plan is either automatically
unfair or unconstitutional?
The problem as to what position stockholders, unsecured creditors,
and secured creditors of differing rank should occupy in the reorganized
company presents a problem to which an answer will only set the outer
limits of a fair plan. It may well be that it is impossible to determine by
rule the participation which should be allowed these groups in every case.
It may well be that a rule of thumb should be established which will
say, for instance, that secured creditors may not be reduced if two-thirds
of them do not consent to the reduction. Such a rule would be based on
See Matter of Tennessee Publishing Co., 8i F. (2d) 463 (C.C.A. 6th, 1936), aff'd 57
S. Ct. 85 (1936), commented on in 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1201 (1936), 35 Mich. L. Rev. 654 (i937);
Dodd, Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy For What?, 48 Harv. L. Rev. zioo.
38

1132 (1935).
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the idea that in most cases a plan which reduced secured claimants and
did not win their two-thirds approval would be an unfair plan, and also
partially on the idea that there is no absolute way of determining fairness, that fairness to a certain extent is a matter of majority rule. Whether
the majority be placed at two-thirds or at a bare majority is a matter of
expedience. It seems unfortunate to talk the language of unconstitutionality. But it is clear that the two-thirds requirement is not the whole
story, for it should be noticed that a determination that creditors may
be reduced if two-thirds consent, is not a determination that all plans
which do this and have a two-thirds consent are fair. All that we have
is a determination that majority consent is one factor in determining
fairness. And it should also be remembered that junior lienholders may
be omitted from the reorganization if it is dear that they have no equity,
and that no claimants inferior to them are permitted participation even
9
though all of the junior lienholders oppose their exclusion. 33
But if majority consent is one factor in determining fairness, and perhaps the most tangible factor, then it must be assumed that the majority
vote of each class participating, from whom a majority vote is required,
represents the genuine desire of the majority. It must be a real election.
The business situation is such, however, that it is very difficult to obtain
a real election.
Writers on reorganization refer to the "masterful" position of the committee. 340 From a business standpoint the masterful position is really that
of the house of issue. It is the house of issue which is usually connected
with the trustees under the indentures. It is usually connected with the
agent for the debtor with whom funds for the payment of interest, principal, or sinking funds are deposited. The house of issue usually has some
control over the debtor because it is the debtor's banker; it may be the
necessary underwriter for new issues of the debtor. As the financial institution most closely related to the debtor, it is only natural that the house
of issue should make loans to the debtor. When reorganization comes, it
is usually the house of issue which organizes the committees for the security holders. In a certain sense, also, the house of issue has control
over the investors who often bought their securities because of the reputation, advertising, or advice of the house of issue. The house of issue with
its control over the trustees, the lists of security holders, the paying agent,
the debtor, the committees, and the investors plays a dominant role in
3 See note 261 supra.
340

See Katz, Protection of Minority Bondholders, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 517,

521

(1936).
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reorganization even though it is not a formal party to the reorganization
proceedings.
The control which the house of issue may exercise is easily illustrated.
The house of issue through its control over the trustee can often regulate the declaration of a default and the acceleration of the mortgage.
It may thus control the time when reorganization proceedings are to begin. Under most indentures, a stated number of the security holders may
compel action by the trustee, but the security holders may not know of
the default; they will not know each other so that it will be hard for the
required number to join together. Even with the required number making a request upon the trustee, action may be delayed if the trustee asks
for indemnity for the costs of any steps it will have to take. Meanwhile
the house of issue with its control over the lists of security holders may
organize its own committees and begin soliciting deposits. Any rival committee will be hampered because it does not have a list of security holders;
it does not have the prestige of the house of issue; and the house of issue
which has been able to begin organizing first will now be in a position
to hurry the reorganization proceedings through its control over the trustee. Security holders who have deposited with the house of issue's committee may, of course, withdraw, but only on the payment of a cash assessment.
The house of issue through its control over the trustee and the paying
agent may prevent defaults in the payment of interest from becoming
known by advancing the money for such payments itself. Such advance-.
ments may be made because of the charitable inclinations of the house of
issue; more often not. Concealing a default in this manner allows the
house of issue to empty its shelves of any hitherto unsold securities of the
issue. 341 Because of its advancements the house of issue becomes a creditor of the debtor, if it already is not. The claim which it has is arguably
on a par with the claims of bondholders, perhaps better, but in any case
it can be liquidated by the acceptance by the house of issue of a second
mortgage on the debtor's property. When this mortgage is f6reclosed,
the house of issue emerges as the owner of the equity. As the equity
owner, or as a creditor in any capacity, the house of issue is deeply interested in the plan of reorganization. It is interested anyway because it
gains power by control over the board of directors of the new company,
for which it expects to act as banker. It can gain this control by desig341 See Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees by the Security and Exchange Commission (Part III, 1936) 17.
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nating the voting trustees for the stockholders of the new company, or
by aiding in the selection of the new directors. The plan which the house
of issue proposes through its committees can be aided by the inaction of
the trustees under the indentures, or directly by the active aid of the
trustees in favoring the plan, or indirectly through letters sent to security
holders. If the house of issue is in any doubt as to its ability to collect
debts owed to it by the debtor in the plan of reorganization, it may be
able to use its control over the trustee to permit substitution of collateral
under the indenture in order to free assets of the debtor from which the
house of issue may collect its debt. By delaying foredosure or the trustee's intervention in a pending receivership proceeding, it can keep rents
and profits from inuring to the benefit of the security holders.
A committee chosen by the house of issue to represent security holders
may actually attempt to work out a plan of reorganization in line with
the best interest of the security holders. The reputation of the house of
issue is said to be at stake. But a house of "interest" whose interests
conflict with the security holders its committee represents is in the position of an arbiter of its own claims and hopes for the future. Further
when the house of issue has organized many committees to represent
security holders who have interests adverse to each other it is difficult
to expect these committees, answerable to the same institution, to work
at cross purposes.
The house of issue, however, is not the only villain of the piece. A
dying corporation attracts many kinds of people, some, but not all, philanthropically inclined. Outsiders, owning no securities or very few, may
organize committees which will gain sufficient deposits to become either
masters of the situation or at least to have a considerable bargaining power.
An outside group, whatever its original motives may be, will soon see
the possibility of controlling the revised corporation.42 The house of issue
may be destroyed as a factor in the new corporation, but a new house
of-issue is substituted in its place. This may be justified on the theory
that the*spoils of reorganization should not stay in one place for too long
a time. It is doubtful whether it can be justified on the theory that
security holders gain better representation.
The fact that security holders are not adequately represented by their
committees is in part the fault of the security holders. The democratic
process always requires responsibility and intelligence on the part of the
34 As for instance the Fortington Group in the reorganization of Paramount Publix Corporation. See Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and
Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees by the Security and Exchange Commission (Part I, 1937), 32.

BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
voters. It may be that the only answer to this portion of the problem is
the greater education of security holders. Organizations for the education
of security holders, it has been suggested, might perform a useful function. 3 Section 77 of the bankruptcy act dealing with railroad reorganization tried to meet this problem in two ways. (i) It required the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the court to pass on the fairness of the plan
before the plan was submitted to the vote of the security holders. This
prevents the court from approving a plan of reorganization merely because security holders have already apparently approved it. This limits
the democratic process and assumes that the court or the Interstate Commerce Commission can recognize fairness or unfairness in a way which
the security holders cannot. (2) Section 77 also outlaws committees, save
those composed of only twenty-five security holders, without the approval
of the Interstate Commerce Commission.343a But it does not indicate what
rules the commission is to make for proper committees, and it gives the
large institutional investors an advantage in that they may organize into
groups of twenty-five and have great power. Section 77 also gives the
court the power to ignore security holders' votes against a plan when
it believes those votes not to have been "reasonably justified."
Section 7 7B on the other hand retained the old procedure of having
security holders vote first, although it, together with section 77, gives
the court power to pass on deposit agreements and to ignore any unfair
provisions, and the effect of the Securities Act has been to promote deposit agreements which do not attempt to bind depositors to an unannounced plan.
A further difficulty with the democratic process as applied to reorganizations is that the interests of all the voters are not the same. The division
into classes for the purposes of voting has never been dearly defined. The
house of issue owning a claim as an unsecured creditor possibly ought to
be treated differently either in the plan of reorganization or in the voting
than other unsecured creditors. Its treatment on voting would not necessarily be dependent upon its treatment in the plan. But at present it is
impossible to tell upon what basis a division into classes for the purpose'
of voting is to be made.
The economic and fair plan which is the object of reorganization apparently is something more than the proper exercise of the democratic
343 This is the thesis of Reis, False Security (1937).
343aNote the protective committee for the first and refunding mortgage and certain debenture securities allowed by the Commission in the reorganization of the New York, New Haven
and Hartford Railroad Co., New York Times, Jan. 16, 1938, Financial Sec., p. i.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

process among security holders. The reorganization acts all require the
court to find the plan fair and feasible. Indeed the tendency is dearly
towards having the court exercise its judgment quite apart from whatever
wishes the security holders may have expressed. This assumes that the
court will be able to know a fair and feasible plan when it sees one. But
the reorganization acts do not instruct the court.
An economically wise and a fair plan would seem to contain the following things: (i) the relative priority between the classes of security holders
should be maintained as a minimum, while in cases of extreme insolvency,
the complete elimination of stockholders or creditors of a lower order is
possible; it would usually be better to permit participation, even though
the right given may only be a right to purchase stock; (2) the removal
of inefficient management, the punishment of fraudulent management;
(3) a capital structure which will not mislead security holders and will
allow the new corporation to operate most efficiently; (4) the direction'
of the activities of the new company into economically sound fields. The
result of such a plan will be that security holders, having been allowed to
vote, and having had their rank preserved will feel satisfied. The future
of the new company of course depends on efficient management. For
the sake of the new company, both by way of revenue and example,
fraudulent old management ought to be disgraced and sued. In order
to provide sufficient cash leaway for operation and to prevent untimely
defaults, the new capital structure should be molded to the demands of
the new company. Its securities ought not to be misleading, if the democratic process in investments is to be made intelligible. This would eliminate debentures with negative pledge clauses of doubtful validity. While
the future direction of the company may be left to an able management,
the reorganization period ought to expose uneconomic activities which
may be eliminated.
The reorganization acts have only partially placed the problem of the
fair plan in this light before the court. It may be assumed that in general
the relative priority will be maintained in any plan found to be fair by
a court. But this is a minimum requirement and an admission that a
plan which meets this minimum requirement should be the result of a
struggle between classes fairly fought. This means that security holders
must be made active and must be fairly represented. Section 7 7 B does
little to promote their activity and fair representation. Section 77 which
deprives security holders of the right to solicit and vote until the plan
has been passed upon by the court would seem to dampen the enthusiasm
of security holders. The ability of security holders to be heard during
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the proceedings is helpful. The ability of the court to gain the list of
security holders from the house of issue under section 77 weakens the
house of issue's dominant position and makes for fairer representation.
Section 77 in making the appointment of a trustee mandatory, and in
prescribing trustee qualifications has done much towards the discovery
of previous fraudulent practices on the part of management, 344 and should
often lead to the removal of the old, and the installation of more efficient,
management. But the appointment of a trustee is not mandatory under
section 7 7B. Further, under section 77, the Interstate Commerce Commission is also required to find that the plan is compatible with the public
interest. This should include a wise capital structure, and one not misleading to security holders. But there are no similar requirements in section 77B.
The problems of reorganization may be thought to be in part insoluble.
Perhaps they may be resolved only by treating reorganization as basically
a struggle between conflicting interests. In a world in which the competitive system exists to some extent throughout the whole economic order,
it would be naive, perhaps, to assume, that competition can be avoided
in a matter so essentially a part of the economic order as the rehabilitation
of debtors and the protection of creditors, stockholders and outsiders in
their scramble for what is, in a sense, a pirates' treasure washed up on
the shore. But throughout the whole economic order, it is increasingly
recognized that there is such a thing as fair and unfair competition. Make
the competition fair,-that is the problem of those who would attempt
to better reorganization practices. Apparently such was the aim of the
47
6
framers of the Chandler345 the Lea 34 and the Barkley bills.3
The Chandler Bill attempts to deal with straight bankruptcy and reorganization. The latter problem is handled in three chapters of the proposed revision of the bankruptcy act. Chapter X deals with corporate
reorganization and is thus a rewritten section 77B. Chapter XI deals with
arrangements and is the section i2 of the present bankruptcy act, dealing
344 See 47 Yale L. J. 285 (1937).
34s H.R. 8o46. This was introduced on July 28, 1937. An earlier draft, H.R. 6439, was introduced on April 15, 1937. Prior to that, there had been two earlier drafts, H.R. 12889, on
which there were amendments proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference, introduced
May 28, 1936, and H.R. io382, on which hearings were held in March and April, 1936.
346 H.R. 6968, Committee Print No. 2, July 29, 1937. This is a revision of the Bill as introduced on May ii, X937.
347 S. 2344, Committee Print No. 3, June 29, 1937, printed in Regulation of Sale of Securities, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, United
States Senate, page 196. There were two prior Committee prints: Committee Print No. i,
May 6, 1927, Committee Print No. 2, June i0, 1937.
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with compositions, and section 74, dealing with the reorganization of
individual debtors, rewritten. Chapter XII deals with real property arrangements, of unincorporated debtors, and as such is entirely new, although, as will be seen, it is a combination of the present section 74 with
some of the aspects of 77B. There is, in addition, a fourth chapter, which,
however, deals with the special problem of wage earners' plans. The
Chandler Bill does not affect present sections 77, railroad reorganization,
75, agricultural compositions and extensions, and 8i, 82, 83 and 84, municipal debt readjustment.
Section 7 7B is recast very much along the lines of section 77. The appointment of a disinterested trustee will be mandatory if the certain
indebtedness of the debtor is $250,000 or more,34s the court will pass upon
the plan before security holders vote349 and before committees are allowed
to solicit deposits.350 Committees representing more thLn twelve security
holders are required to file statements, which are to include a copy of
the deposit agreement, the history of the organization of the committee,
a statement of the securities owned by the organizing institution or person behind the committee, and the claims of the committee members. S'
Before security holders may vote on the plan, the plan must be submitted
to the Securities and Exchange Commission for a report if the debtor
has an indebtedness in excess of $3,ooo,ooo, and may be submitted if the
indebtedness is less. 352 The plan when submitted to security holders has
with it the report of the Commission, if any report is made. 353 This provision differs from section 77 in that the report of the Securities and Exchange Commission is only advisory; 354 it will serve to clarify the issues
on which security holders are voting. The plan itself is to be drawn up
by the trustee if a trustee is appointed.35 In this respect the proposed
chapter is entirely different than any of the other federal reorganization
acts. In those cases where the appointment of a trustee is not mandatory
and the debtor is continued in possession, plans may be fied by (i) the
debtor, (2) any creditor or indenture trustee, (3) any stockholder, if the
debtor is not found to be insolvent, (4) a disinterested person who has
348 § r56 of H.R. 8046 hereafter referred to as "Chandler Bill."
349 § 174; for confirmation of plan see § 221.
330 § 176.
351§ 212.
352§ 172. The S.E.C. is given broad powers as to notice and
:6x.
3S3§ 175(3).

hearing. See §§ 265, 2o8,

173,

M34
§ 172.

3ss § 169. An examiner may be appointed, where the debtor is continued in possession, to

prepare a plan, report on the debtor, examine witnesses, etc. See §§ i68, 167.

BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
been appointed by the court as examiner to prepare and file a plan. 3S6
The chapter as found in an earlier draft, required a sinking fund or some
other method for the retirement of obligations with a maturity of more
than five years; this is now only discretionary.35 7 The chapter also gives
greater power to the indenture trustee for representation of security
5
holders.3 1
The proposed section increases to $5000 the amount of claims which
three creditors must possess before they can fie an involuntary petition,
but it removes the requirement that this amount must be above the
security held by them. 35 9 It also allows creditors of the debtor's property
to file. It retains the requirement that petitioning creditors must either
prove an act of bankruptcy or the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding
or equity receivership.360 But it clarifies bankruptcy proceeding to mean
where the debtor was adjudged a bankrupt,36' and it broadens the meaning of equity receivership to include the appointment of a receiver in a
foreclosure proceeding and to include a trustee in possession under an
indenture.36 2 Insolvency either in the bankruptcy or equity sense is preserved as the basis of jurisdiction in any case. 363 The act broadens the
powers of the court to obtain the lists of security holders; to impound such
lists; and to open them for inspection upon such terms as it may prescribe, 364 thus adapting devices developed in receivership proceedings by
judges Lockwood and Mack. The qualifications for trustee are more
stringent than those under section 77. They are calculated to separate
the trustee from the debtor, stockholders, creditors, and underwriters. 36s
36 § i7o.
35s See

§ 126

3S7§ 2x6 (9).
(file petition), § 144 (file answer), § 170 (may prepare plan), § 198 (may file

claims), § 242 (specific provision for compensation). There are various provisions requiring
notice to the indenture trustee. §§ 190, 178, 17I, 247. See also §§ 166, 197, 2o6, 207. The
court likewise has greater control over the trustee under the indenture. See §§ 227, 213, 212,
211.

359The claims must be "liquidated as to amount and not contingent as to liability." An
indenture trustee may file a petition without other creditors joining with him. § 126.
360 § 131 (1) and (2).
-"'§ 131().
36

§ 131(3), and (4). This last subdivision provides: "that a proceeding to foreclose a mort-

gage or to enforce a lien against all or the greater part of the property of the corporation is
pending."
363 § i3o(i). Every petition must give "the status of any plan of reorganization, readjustment, or liquidation affecting the property of the corporation, pending either in connection
with or without any judicial proceeding." § 130(6).
364 §§ 164, I65, i66.
3s § 158. The trustee may not be a creditor or stockholder, or underwriter of outstanding
securities, or within 5 years have been the underwriter of any securities of the debtor. He may
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The act requires the plan to include provisions as to the selection of the
new directors and any voting trustees. 366 The court's jurisdiction over
fees is somewhat broader than at present and a specific provision requires
that no compensation or reimbursement be given to a committee, attorney, or other person, acting in a representative or fiduciary character,
who bought or sold claims or shares of stock after the proceedings began.367
The proposed recasting of section 77B thus clarifies the present section
to meet many of the objections made by courts, and it adopts the advances
made by the present amended section 77. It may be expected that the
court will gain greater control over the plan of reorganization through its
control over a disinterested and active trustee. But it may be questioned
whether the effect of having the trustee draw up the plan of reorganization is wholly to the good. No plan can be satisfactory to all elements.
It is sometimes desirable to allow these elements to propose their own
plans first, and then through the ensuing struggle work out a compromise.
The position of the Securities and Exchange Commission would seem
very advantageous to such an end. But once the security holders feel
that the plan upon which the Commission comments is not their plan,
they are likely to be dissatisfied. This may be partially corrected by
allowing all security holders to present suggestions to the trustee. 368 It
might have been better for the court to appoint a representative for each
major class of security holder when the investments are sufficiently large.
Chapter X differs from old section 74, which it displaces, in that it
not be or have been within two years a director, officer, employee, or attorney of the debtor
or underwriter. These prohibitions also apply to the attorney for the trustee except in special
cases. § 157.
36 § 220(11); § 221(5).
§ 249. [The April i5

draft of the Chandler Bill, H.R. 6439, included "in contemplation
of such proceeding." § 12, II e(g).] See §§ 242 to 250 for the fee provisions. §§ 244 and 258
deal with the problem of compensation for services rendered in prior proceedings.
Note the Act of August 25, 1937, 28 U.S.C.A. § 572A, which provides in part that "it shall
be unlawful for any party in interest or any attorney for any party in interest, in receivership,
367

bankruptcy, or reorganization proceeding, in or under the supervision of any court of the
United States, to enter into any agreement, written or oral, express or implied, with any other

party in interest, or any attorney of any other party in interest, in such proceeding for the purpose of fixing the amount of the fees or other compensation to be paid to any party in interest,
or any attorney of any party in interest." Section b provides that it shall be unlawful for the
judge to approve the payment of a fee set by an unlawful agreement. It is not clear what effect
this Act will have on agreements to have the fee set by an impartial arbiter, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission.
368 § 167(6): The trustee "shall give notice to the creditors and stockholders that they may

submit to him suggestions for the formulation of a plan, or proposals in the form of plans,
within a time therein named." See also § 169.

BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
is now applicable to corporations, and in that secured claims may not
even be extended.-6 9 The only one who may submit a plan under Chapter
XI is the debtor. This is somewhat anomalous in that Chapter XI, old
section 77B, tends to take away from the debtor the power to propose
a plan37 0 Moreover, there is no indication under Chapter XI of how
stockholders are to operate and whether they shall vote on the proposed
plan which the debtor submits. The plan to be proposed does not include
a change in the rights of stockholders, 37' although it seems that any complete readjustment, even if it did not affect secured claims might well
effect such a change. Unlike old section 74, proposed Chapter XI does
authorize class voting, but apparently the division into classes must be
based on the treatment accorded creditors in the plan.372 The section
does not mention committees nor trustees under indentures, even though
both of these exist for unsecured creditors.37 3 The appointment of a receiver is still not mandatory3 7 4 While the court is to pass on the fairness
of the plan,375 the section has a provision which might be interpreted to
make court approval automatic if all the unsecured creditors agree to
the readjustment.376 Before a petition under Chapter X (old section 77B)
may be filed in good faith it will have to be shown that adequate relief
could not be obtained under Chapter XI.377 On the other hand, there is
no longer any good faith requirement under Chapter X. 3 75 An additional
peculiarity of Chapter XI is that only claims provided for in the plan
369 § 3o6(I): "'Arrangement' shall mean any plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension of the time of payment of his unsecured debts, upon any terms .......
370 And, furthermore, the first draft of the Lea Bill, H.R. 6468, provided in § ii that "A

reorganization plan may be deemed to be improperly proposed ....
(2) if any person who is
directly or indirectly proposing such plan or causing the same to be proposed is the issuer.
311 § 257.

372 § 351. "For the purpose of the arrangement and its acceptance."

§§ 337(2), 338, 327, but the reference is to
§ 44b which "provides for the appointment by the creditors at their first meeting of a committee of not less than three creditors to consult with and advise the trustee in connection with
the administration of the estate." (Report No. 1409, 75th Cong. Ist Sess. (1937), i.).
373It does mention committees of creditors in

374 § 332. Although if a trustee in bankruptcy has previously been appointed, the court
must continue such trustee in possession.
37S§ 366.
376§ 36i. The court must be satisfied that the arrangement and its acceptance are in good

faith and have not been made or procured by any means, promises or acts forbidden by the
Act. This is different, however, than a finding that the plan "is fair and equitable and feasible,"
required under § 366(3).
377 § X30(7).

378 § 323. But the petition must set forth the provisions of the arrangement proposed by

him.
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are to be discharged, 379 but it is also provided that the plan is to be
binding on all claims whether they are provided for in the plan or not.30
This seems to be dearly an error in draftsmanship.35 ' The act requires
the deposit of money necessary to pay all debts having priority before
confirmation of the plan.32
Chapter XII is applicable to holdings of real estate or chattels real;
it allows secured obligations to be altered or modified. 538 It is only applicable to unincorporated debtors and the arrangement which may be
proposed must modify the rights of secured creditors; 384 nevertheless the
definition of creditors includes unsecured creditors, 3' s and the arrangement "may provide for treatment of unsecured debts on a parity one
with the other, or for the division of such debts into classes and the treatment thereof in different ways or upon different terms."' 531 The chapter
fails to define what is a real estate or chattel real holding for its purposes.
Otherwise the chapter generally follows the pattern set by the present
section 77 B, except that the creditors may not file a petition.3 7 The
debtor is required to propose an arrangement in his petition. 531 Creditors
who have claims against the property may propose an arrangement,
which has been accepted by 25 per centum in amount of some class of
creditors and io per centum in amount of the claims of all creditors35 9
The court has control over fees;390 the appointment of a receiver is per-

missive. 391
The proposed bankruptcy act also includes a Chapter XIII, under
which wage earners may offer a plan of composition or extension to their
creditors. The chapter does not affect claims secured by real estate or

393
chattels real.392 It may not affect secured creditors unless they consent.
379 §371.
380 § 367.
38x

382

It may be possible to reconcile these provisions, but the provisions are not clear.
§ 337(2), 361.

383 § 406(1) "'Arrangements'
shall mean any plan altering or modifying the rights of creditors or of any class of them, holding debts secured by real property or a chattel real of which
the debtor is the legal or equitable owner."
384 Ibid.

383§ 406(5) and (2).

387

386§ 46r(3).

388

389

§ 421.
§423.

§ 466. This section speaks of debts of creditors; obviously dainms is intended.

390 H8 491, 492,

493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498.

381 §§ 432, 437(1).

392§ 6o6(i).
393 § 652(1); cf. § 646(2), which is somewhat misleading in stating that a plan "may include
provisions dealing with secured debts severally, upon any terms."
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It is puzzling to understand the psychology of the draftsmen who felt
(i) that secured creditors of a corporation could not be dealt with under
Chapter XI, but they might if the corporation is sufficiently sick to come
under Chapter X; (2) that secured creditors with claims against real
property of an individual debtor could be scaled down, while secured
creditors of a corporation which owns real property may not be scaled
down, unless it can proceed under Chapter X; (3)that unsecured creditors
of a corporation obliged to proceed under Chapter XI may have their
claims reduced, but that no provision need be made for arranging claims
of stockholders-the "sacredness" of security is turned topsy turvey; and
(4)that an individual debtor may scale down claims against his real property, while a wage earner's rugged morality must be protected against
such demoralizing arrangement practice. But, of course, they might believe that a debtor who is a freeholder ought to receive much kinder treatment than a mere wage earner.
Other legislation has been introduced in Congress which if enacted
might result in more sweeping changes in reorganization practice than
the revised Chandler Bill. In particular, the Committee Act of 1937,394
known as the Lea Bill, and the Trust Indenture Act of I937, 395 known as
the Barkley Bill, would do much to avoid the possibility of conflicting
interests arising to mitigate the effectiveness of the representation of
security holders by committees, or by trustees under indentures. The very
presence of the Lea Bill is some indication that despite the provisions
under Chapter X of the Chandler Bill forbidding the solicitation of acceptances or of authority to accept a plan, until after the entry of an
order approving the plan,396 it is thought that committees will be in operation under that chapter. Arguments advanced against both the Lea and
Barkley Bills are based on business expediency, and as a result of these
arguments both bills have been materially modified, although apparently
39 7
not sufficiently to satisfy their opponents.
394 H.R. 6968, July 29, 1937, Committee Print No. 2. An addition then is H.R. 6963 which
would give the Securities and Exchange Commission powers over committees, powers to intervene and to file reports in plans of reorganization.
319S. 2344, 75th Cong. ist Sess., Committee Print No. 3, June 29, 1937, found in Hearing
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency (1937) i96.
396 § 176 of the Chandler Bill.
397 See Hearing on H.R. 6968, 1937, 153 et seq. Note statement by G. S. Canright in Hearing on S. 2344, 1937, 131 et seq.
The Committee of Administration of Bankruptcy Law of the Chicago Bar Association,
after due deliberation and under the chairmanship of Mr. Benjamin Wham, has adopted a report of its subcommittee concerning the Lea Bill. Eleven specific objections are made to the
Lea Bill: (i) the "language of the Bill is so broad that it may well be construed to include ordi-
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The Lea Bill would in effect give the Securities and Exchange Commission control over all committees soliciting deposits, which use any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails. Its provisions would do
much to separate committees from the control of the house of issue or
the debtor. It would require generally that members of committees own
some of the securities of the class they represent and that they have no
conflicting interests. In its original form the Lea Bill also included provisions which would have allowed the Securities and Exchange Commission
to pass on plans of reorganization, and it was calculated to discourage
debtor plans. There was also an attempt to require state courts to pass
upon plans before they were submitted to security holders. These latter
provisions have now been removed. The Lea Bill in its present form is
not adequately correlated with the Chandler Bill, and revision along that
line is no doubt necessary.398
The proposed Trust Indenture Act of I937399 would ban the now usual

exculpatory provisions from new indentures, impose active duties on trustees under indentures, in effect separate the trustee from the influence
of the debtor or house of issue, limit the trustee's rights to be a creditor,
and in general require the removal of a trustee having adverse interests.
The act shows the influence of New York's Streit law.
nary business transactions not intended to be included by its draftsmen"; (2) the Bill does not
define what ownership of securities will be considered to be beneficial ownership; (3) "by precluding the issuer and underwriter from taking any part in the solicitation of deposits the Bill
has taken away the only effective way of securing prompt deposit of securities"; (4) the underwriters or its nominees, "officers and directors of issuers and common stockholders," should be
allowed to take part in the solicitation of deposits; (5) "it has often been necessary for protective committees to incur substantial expenses which could only be met through loans obtained
by pledging deposited securities. Under the wording of this Bill, it is doubtful if committees
organized under-its provisions can so finance themselves"; (6) it is not practicable to require
the filing of a copy of the proposed plan of reorganization; (7) all pending reorganizations
should be exempted from provisions of this Bill; (8) "it would seem advisable, in the interest of
expediency, to permit assents to be counted as at present where the holder fails to dissent
within a stated period"; (9) the Bill will regulate matters in state courts and under state
practices which vary and "we doubt whether or not this Bill could be conformed to such varied
laws and practices"; (io) the provisions should be revised to conform to the Chandler Bill;
(ii) "we are opposed to the giving to any politically constituted body the broad powers given
by this Bill to the Securities & Exchange Commission."
Possibly this committee will give further study to its report. For instance, Sec. 304(a)(2)
of the Lea Bill includes, as an exempted solicitation, a solicitation in respect of a class of
securities to which public solicitation was made prior to the sixtieth day after the enactment
of the Bill.
398 For instance the Lea Bill is applicable apparently only to Chapter X and not to Chapters
XI and XII of the Chandler Bill.

399 See note 395 supra.

BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
It may thus be seen that the law of arrangements and reorganization
has changed radically in the United States during the depression. It is
still changing. At present the philosophy behind the acts is confused.
Some sections are calculated to give the debtor control over the proceedings; others attempt to do the same for the creditor. It is becoming dear,
however, that the object of an arrangement is an economically sound
and fair plan. It is not at all dear what is meant by a fair plan. The acts
show both a tendency to remove the vote of the security holders as an
important part in the determination of fairness, and a tendency to
strengthen the representation of security holders so that when a vote is
obtained it will reflect maturer judgment on the part of the security
holders. Possibly the greatest stumbling block in the attempt to arrive
at fair plans was the conflict of interest inherent in almost every reorganization agency. The proposed legislation will do much to eliminate this.
The proposed Committee Act also shows an awareness that reorganization
through the bankruptcy sections is merely a part of the larger problem of
the reconstruction of debtors. If such an attitude prevails it will break
down the artificial barriers which now exist between stockholder recapitalization problems, voluntary arrangements, and bankruptcy reorganization. It will certainly break down the barriers which the proposed revision
of the bankruptcy act would impose. It may well lead to an understanding
that the problem of reorganization is basically a problem of protection
of credit. In the corporation field this can only be done by control over
the original corporate structure. The new legislation already shows the
desire of the framers to control the corporate structure after reorganization. This logically leads to control before reorganization. The simplification of the corporate structure can best be obtained through a corporation act. A federal corporation act may well be the coming answer. It
may well be that self-imposed limitations on the bankruptcy power will
disappear when it is understood that in the beginning of a corporation is
its end. The reorganization sections may become simply federal debtor
laws and federal incorporation acts.

